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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's 
February 24, 1993, ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR REVIEW 
alleging entitlement to permanent, total disability benefits 
sustained as a result of an industrial accident. A PETITION FOR 
REVIEW of that ORDER was timely filed with this Court on March 18, 
1993. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this PETITION FOR REVIEW 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 35-
1-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE (S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There are three substantial issues presented for review: 
(1) Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err in determining 
that Kleinsmith had to prove that his industrial injury was the 
"significant" cause of his permanent, total disability. 
(2) Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err in determining 
that Kleinsmith was not permanently, totally disabled due to his 
industrial injury, and, 
(3) Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err in making a 
finding that Kleinsmith was disabled due to a non-industrial cause 
without sending this medical causation issue to a Medical Panel. 
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the 
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of 
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to 
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the agency7s view of the law is required. Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d) 
(1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 
1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope 
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize 
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to 
compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. State 
Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 
1984). McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 
1977) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67(1988) and 35-1-77(1) (a) 
(1988) are the determinative statutes in this case. Rule 568-1-9 
of the Industrial Commission's Administrative Rules is also 
applicable. They are set forth in full in the Addendum hereto as 
EXHIBIT A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Kleinsmith seeks review of the Industrial Commission ORDER 
denying his MOTION FOR REVIEW wherein he alleged entitlement to 
permanent, total disability compensation occasioned by his 
industrial accident. 
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Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Kleinsmith filed an Application for Hearing claiming 
permanent, total disability compensation benefits sustained as the 
result of an industrial injury that occurred on October 31, 1990. 
(R. at 1) . Respondents alleged that Mr. Kleinsmith did not 
sustain a compensable industrial injury and is thus not entitled to 
permanent, total disability benefits. (R. at 12). A hearing was 
held on April 9, 1992. (R. at 26). 
Disposition Below 
On November 25, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge held that 
Plaintiff had failed to prove legal and medical causation that his 
October 31, 1990, industrial accident was a significant cause of 
his permanent, total disability. A Medical Panel was not appointed 
to examine Mr. Kleinsmith or review his medical records. His claim 
for permanent, total disability benefits was dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to establish medical causation. (R. at 102-
111, copy attached to Addendum as EXHIBIT B). 
He filed a MOTION FOR REVIEW with the Industrial Commission on 
December 23, 1992, which was denied on February 24, 1993. (R. at 
145-151, copy attached to Addendum as EXHIBIT C). He now 
challenges that final agency action in this PETITION FOR REVIEW 
before the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Statement of the Facts 
Danny Kleinsmith (also referred to herein as "Petitioner") was 
employed by Allied Van Lines as a truck driver on October 31, 1990, 
when the accident giving rise to this claim occurred. (R. at 1). 
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On that date, while engaged in the regular course and scope of his 
employment, Mr, Kleinsmith was exiting the cab of his semi truck 
while at a stop in Logan, Utah. He lost his grip on the support 
bar next to the door of the cab and fell backwards about four feet 
down, onto pavement, landing on his head, neck and upper back 
areas. Mr. Kleinsmith experienced neck, shoulder and right upper 
extremity pain and problems in the following days. (R. at 104-
109) . 
Mr. Kleinsmith sought treatment from orthopedic surgeon 
Dr. Glen Church for his neck/shoulder/back problems. (R. at 332-
343) . After more than half a year of treatment by Dr. Church, with 
no significant relief, it was concluded that neck surgery was 
warranted. (R. at 343). Thus, Dr. Church performed a discectomy 
and fusion of C4-5 and C5-6 on April 15, 1991. (R. at 265). 
Almost one month later (May 11, 1991), just after receiving word 
from his occupational health insurance carrier that the surgery 
would not be covered, Mr. Kleinsmith had an apparent heart attack. 
(R. at 340). He checked into Logan Regional Hospital where 
observation and testing, but no surgery or evasive procedures, were 
performed. (R. at 227-250). 
The Petitioner also had a five vessel coronary bypass 
operation on June 12, 1984, from which he recovered nicely. He did 
not return to work for a few months after this surgery but then 
worked continually, strong as ever, until his industrial accident 
of October 31, 1990. (R. at 276-329). 
Since the Petitioner began seeing Dr. Church (December 26, 
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1990) , Dr. Church has had Mr. Kleinsmith off work due to his upper 
back problems. (R. at 342). Unfortunately, Dr. Church died on 
April 1, 1992, making it impossible to seek clarification on a 
chart note made September 26, 1991 reflecting that, "Therefore, 
because of his age and his myocardial infarction, in my opinion he 
should have a total permanent disability rating." (R. at 343) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S) 
The Petitioner undeniably suffered an industrial injury on 
October 31, 1990. None of the parties disputes the validity of 
that accident and the attendant legal and medical causation. Nor 
does anyone dispute that Petitioner is presently permanently and 
totally disabled. The sole issue is whether his permanent, total 
disability status is medically caused by his industrial accident. 
While one phrase in a repeated chart note seems to undercut such a 
finding in his favor, that is true only if it is read in isolation 
and without reference to the totality of the record. The chart 
notes of Dr. Glen Church with respect to Petitioner's "age and his 
myocardial infarction" are particularly suspect due to Dr. Church's 
untimely death and resulting inability to explain the ambiguities 
contained therein. 
This case presents "significant medical issues" which mandate 
the utilization of a Medical Panel under the Industrial 
Commission's own Rules and Regulations. Such a referral would have 
allowed an evaluation by expert medical doctors who would have the 
Petitioner's entire medical records, not just several misleading 
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chart notes. The findings of the Social Security Administration 
are particularly suspect on this ground because they did not have 
Petitioner's medical records regarding his spine. 
This Court should summarily reverse the Industrial 
Commission's determination that Petitioner did not establish 
medical causation and remand with instructions to enter an award 
establishing that fact. In the alternative, this matter should be 
remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene 
a Medical Panel to examine the medical causation issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY 
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER. 
Few principles of workers7 compensation law are as well 
established in this State as the fact that workers7 compensation 
disability claims are to be liberally construed in favor of 
awarding benefits, and any doubts raised from the evidence are to 
be resolved in favor of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently 
reiterated this principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. 
Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State v. Industrial 
Commission, supra., J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 
1362 (Utah 1980) ; McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v. 
Industrial Commission, 405 P. 2d 613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. 
Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v. 
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Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler. supra. discussed the 
proper construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the 
underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that 
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the 
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be 
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his 
dependents in case death supervenes. The right to 
compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of 
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act 
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or 
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to 
*employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the 
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as 
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are 
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs 
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such 
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those 
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or 
death to provide adequate means for the support of those 
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of 
total disability or death of the employee his dependents 
might become the objects of public charity, such a 
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or 
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right 
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such 
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such 
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason, 
if for no other. should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are 
all united upon the proposition that in view of the 
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as 
the case may be. Id. at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added) 
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her FINDINGS OF FACT 
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AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW failed to apply this vital rule of 
construction. Nowhere in her findings or conclusions is there any 
evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in 
favor of the claim". Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appeared in 
the record, the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission construed it against the Petitioner which is contrary to 
the correct statutory construction required in a workers' 
compensation case. This is particularly true in regards to the 
blind deference to an incomplete Social Security file which did not 
contain Petitioner's most relevant medical records. 
In light of the Industrial Commission's failure to properly 
apply the Utah Workers' Compensation statutes, the finding of a 
lack of medical causation, for the reasons set forth below, is 
simply not supported by the record. The entire underlying basis of 
the ORDER is thus flawed. The "findings" and "conclusions" do not 
evidence "humane and beneficent purposes" as required by law. The 
ORDER should be reversed due to this conceptional flaw. 
II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PETITIONER WAS NOT PERMANENTLY, TOTALLY DISABLED AS A 
RESULT OF HIS INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Kleinsmith was 
awarded Social Security Disability based solely upon his coronary 
condition and that his neck/back problems were not the 
"significant" cause of keeping Mr. Kleinsmith out of the work 
force. (R. at 110). The medical and testimonial evidence, 
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however, clearly indicate that the Petitioner was made permanently, 
totally disabled due to his October 31, 1990, industrial accident. 
The Administrative Law Judge places great weight on the fact 
that Petitioner was awarded Social Security Disability benefits 
solely on the basis of his coronary condition. It is, however, a 
distortion of the record to imply that the Social Security 
Administration ruled out his neck/back/shoulder problems as having 
any contribution to his admittedly permanent, total disability 
status. The plain fact is that the Social Security Administration 
did not have all of Petitioner's medical records and never 
attempted to sort out the relative contributions of his many 
physical ailments. He met a Social Security Disability "listing" 
due to his coronary condition, so the Social Security 
Administration did not have to look any further into his disability 
claim. The Industrial Commission, however, should look carefully 
at all of a Petitioner's medical records and determine the true 
cause of his or her disability. 
The very letter from the Social Security Administration which 
the Administrative Law Judge relied upon (R. at 126, copy attached 
hereto in Addendum as EXHIBIT D) makes clear that the only records 
considered by Social Security where those of Dr. Redd, his 
Cardiologist. Nancy J. Hughes, SSI Operations Supervisor, 
specifically stated that: "The records of Dr. Church, the doctor 
for his neck/back/upper extremities were not considered so it may 
well be that he could have qualified for SSI benefits upon those 
problems as well." (R. at 126 and EXHIBIT D). 
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To say that Mr. Kleinsmith was awarded Social Security 
Disability based solely upon his coronary condition and blindly 
hold that this condition is what keeps him from returning to work 
with no further inquiry or findings of fact is at best an oversight 
and at worst, an aberration of judicial due process, particularly 
in light of Ms. Hughes' statement. Obviously his Social Security 
Disability could not have been based on his neck/back/shoulder 
problems if such records were not even requested and considered by 
the Social Security Administration. 
The cursory review of Mr. Kleinsmith7s case at the Social 
Security Administration resulted in him being awarded benefits for 
one reason (coronary) when he could have just as easily been 
awarded those benefits for another reason (neck/back/shoulder) , had 
those records even been considered. This indiscriminate processing 
of his Social Security claim by a claims examiner should not 
prejudice him from receiving workers7 compensation benefits based 
upon the real reason he cannot work. 
Finally, it should be noted that Utah Code Annotated, Section 
35-1-67(1) does not require a wholesale adoption of permanent, 
total disability factual findings by the Social Security 
Administration. Rather, it requires that the Commission adopt 
rules which follow the "substance" of the federal sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration. 
There is intended, and due process requires, that there be some 
fact finding on the part of the Commission to determine what is 
causing the Petitioner's permanent, total disability status. 
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The Industrial Commission's ruling in this case creates the 
precedent and informal rule that the Commission is to be bound by 
the findings of the Social Security Administration in every future 
permanent, total disability claim with no latitude in determining 
the true cause of disability. This is not what Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-67(1) mandates. 
Medical causation in this case was provided by Petitioner's 
neurosurgeon Dr. Otmar W. Albrand. Dr. Albrand concretely and 
unambiguously established both legal and medical causation in his 
December 10, 1992, report where he remarks as follows: "It is my 
opinion that Mr. Kleinsmith is suffering from injuries sustained 
10-31-90 in an industrial accident and due to these injuries he's 
unable to return to substantial work or gainful employment." (R. at 
127) . 
Moreover, Dr. Church, the Petitioner's former neurologist, had 
mentioned that the Petitioner was permanently, totally disabled 
"because of his age and his myocardial infarction." (R. at 343). 
However, as Mr. Kleinsmith testified at the hearing, it was his 
understanding that Dr. Church had him off work solely for his 
neck/back/shoulder problems (R. at 419-421) and that due to this 
condition (his back), compounded with his age and coronary 
condition, he is permanently, totally disabled. This is evidenced 
by Dr. Church's July 8, 1991, letter wherein he lists both the 
coronary condition as well as the neck as being permanently, total 
disabling. (R. at 6) . Stating that Petitioner is disabled due to 
his neck (compounded by his age and coronary condition) would also 
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make sense given that Dr. Church is a neurologist, treating 
Mr. Kleinsmith for his back condition. Dr. Albrand confirms this 
by stating, "He (Dr. Church) was his treating physician and I'm 
sure his opinion was related to his knowledge of Mr. Danny 
Kleinsmith while he was his treating physician." (emphasis added, 
R. at 127) . That is, Dr. Church's opinion of total disability was 
related to his knowledge of Mr. Kleinsmith and the neck surgery Dr. 
Church had performed and treated him for. Dr. Church took the 
Applicant off work due to his neck and continued to have him off 
work for his neck alone (R. at 342) through the date of his 
(Dr. Church's) death. As a neurologist who treats the spine, he is 
not qualified to pass judgment on Mr. Kleinsmith's coronary 
condition and, knowing that Mr. Kleinsmith was in the able hands of 
cardiologist Dr. Redd, would leave such determinations regarding 
that condition with Dr. Redd. 
The Administrative Law Judge asserts that "there are medical 
records of incapacitating heart problems." (R. at 110). This is 
entirely inaccurate. The only evidence of incapacitating heart 
problems are those from his June 12, 1984. five vessel coronary 
bypass operation when he was off work for the few months following. 
He was able to return to full-time, full duty work by the Fall of 
1984. (R. at 431 - 435). 
After the second heart attack of May 11, 1991, he simply had 
treadmill and other various testing, no surgery of any kind, and 
was released. No doctor, Dr. Redd included, instructed him to 
refrain from work due to his coronary condition following his 
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second heart attack. Even a lay person can appreciate the illogic 
of asserting that after a major five vessel coronary bypass surgery 
a man can return to work as strong as an ox but after a far less 
severe heart attack requiring no treatment or surgery, the same man 
is incapacitated. He was already incapacitated from his neck/back 
problems and instructed to be off work for the previous half a year 
at the time of the second heart attack on May 11, 1991. 
The coronary condition did not take him out of the work force, 
nor is it keeping him out. He was working strong with his coronary 
condition from 1984 through the date of his industrial accident to 
his spine on October 31, 1990. 
The Petitioner is dumbfounded by the ALJ's finding that, "His 
cervical problems were only temporarily incapacitating following 
surgery, and even then, they were not wholly the result of the 
industrial incident." (R. at 110). The Applicant was never 
released by Dr. Church, nor anyone else, with respect to his spinal 
problems and his current doctor. Dr. Albrand, is also of the 
opinion that he has been and remains to this day unable to return 
to substantial, gainful employment due to his back/neck problems. 
Three years and continuing indefinitely is hardly "temporarily 
incapacitating." The fact that his problems may not wholly be the 
result of the industrial incident is irrelevant for purposes of 
determining permanent, total disability. 
The relevant inquiry, in its simplest terms is, "What took Mr. 
Kleinsmith out of the work force and is keeping him out?" Any pre-
existing component simply relates to the potential contribution 
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from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. He worked continually 
through the date of the accident and, as Dr. Albrand states, is 
suffering from spinal injuries on October 31, 1990, and is unable 
to work due to those injuries. Clearly, it is the October 31, 
1990, industrial injury which took him out of the work force and is 
preventing him from returning to work. 
The only other possible implication pre-existing has in this 
case would be to claim that the Petitioner must meet the higher 
standard of causation set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). However, Mr. Kleinsmith's fall from four 
feet onto his back onto concrete clearly satisfies this unexpected, 
unintended extraordinary exertion contemplated by Allen. 
Additionally, any alleged pre-existing problems all point to 
his July 30, 1989, industrial accident which happened in the course 
and scope of his employment with Allied. Thus, since the alleged 
pre-existing occurred with the same employer, the higher standard 
of causation set forth in Allen would not apply anyway. See. Fred 
Meyer v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990). 
If he is to be off work due to his coronary condition, then 
why hasn't his long-standing cardiologist taken him off work? 
Because, as Dr. Redd states, "the patients original disability was 
the result of an injury he sustained while working." (R. at 128). 
He continues by stating that Mr. Kleinsmith should also seek the 
opinion of a neurologist regarding permanent, total disability and 
that if confirmed, his workers' compensation claim "should be 
honored as this would be the primary reason for his having left 
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work and also the reason why he cannot return to work." (R. at 
128). Dr. Otmar W. Albrand's letter of December 10, 1992 does 
exactly that - his is a neurologist treating Mr. Kleinsmith's back 
who states that the primary reason why he cannot work is his back 
and thus, his workers' compensation claim should be honored. (R. at 
127) . 
The Administrative Law Judge states that, "The record contains 
no clear physician's opinion which states that Kleinsmith is 
permanently and totally disabled due to his cervical problem, nor 
even that his cervical problems were solely caused by his 
industrial accident." (R. at 110). In light of Dr. Albrand's 
December 10, 1992, letter (R. at 127), this is an incredulous 
assertion. Dr. Albrand unequivocally states that Mr. Kleinsmith 
is permanently, totally disabled and that it is because of the 
cervical problems from his 10-31-90 industrial injury. (R. at 127) . 
The Utah Court of Appeals should remand this matter back to 
the Industrial Commission for a finding of permanent, total 
disability as a result of the Applicant's October 31, 1990, 
industrial accident. 
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THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN NOT 
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL TO ASSIST IN THE 
RESOLUTION OF THE MEDICAL CAUSATION ISSUE, 
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) reads as 
follows: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by 
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course 
of employment, and if the employer or its insurance 
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the 
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medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed 
by the commission• 
Utah Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 governing the 
"Necessity of submitting a case to a Medical Panel" provides in 
relevant part as follows: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission 
adopts the following guidelines in determining the 
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000.... See Addendum, EXHIBIT A. 
The Rule mandatorily requires that a panel "will" be used when 
"one or more significant medical issues may be involved". The rule 
does not give the Administrative Law Judge unbridled discretion to 
determine the existence of such issues, but rather definitively 
states that, "Significant medical issues are involved where there 
are: (a) conflicting medical reports of permanent physical 
impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole person...." 
It cannot be disputed that this case clearly contains 
conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which 
vary by more than 5% of the whole person. The Administrative Law 
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Judge and the Industrial Commission have essentially taken the 
position that there is no industrially related impairment from the 
cervical injuries. Thus, the disparity in the ratings is over 
100%. In such a case the need for Medical Panel referral is 
mandatory. 
The failure to refer to a Medical Panel in this cases is more 
than an abuse of discretion - it is plain error. See Lipman v. 
Industrial Commission, supra and Schmidt v. Industrial Commission. 
617 P. 2d 693 (Utah 1980) interpreting the former Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1953) which made referrals to medical 
panels mandatory in cases of denied liability. 
Although reference to a Medical Panel under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is discretionary, that discretion 
is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory by the Commission's 
own Rules and Regulations (Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9) . The failure 
to refer a matter to a Medical Panel when such referral is 
mandatory is plain error. "In some cases, such as where the 
evidence of causal connection between the work-related event and 
the injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer the 
case to a medical panel may be an abuse of discretion." Champion 
Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 
1985). See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related 
injury and the Applicant's permanent, total disability is clear to 
the Applicant and confirmed by the medical records but the ALJ 
interpreted the medical records otherwise. Thus, the issue of 
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medical causation then became uncertain, and failure to refer the 
matter to a Medical Panel was error. The Commission's ORDER 
DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW should at a minimum be reversed and the 
matter remanded with directions to refer the matter to a medical 
panel since failure to do so was in direct conflict with Industrial 
Commission practice and rule. The failure to obtain a Medical 
Panel opinion resulted in the Administrative Law Judge lacking 
essential and necessary information to adjudicate Petitioner's 
claim. The ALJ instead took the place of a medical panel and 
despite substantial evidence to the contrary, ruled that the 
claimant's disability was caused by his coronary condition. This 
is precisely the function of a medically trained panel. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
This case presents substantial evidence that Petitioner's 
permanent, total disability status is legally and medically the 
result of his industrial injury. Dr. Albrand's report on that 
point is clear and unequivocal. The Industrial Commission in 
denying benefits to the Petitioner has ignored and failed to apply 
the beneficent and entire purpose of the workers compensation 
system. 
The failure to refer to a Medical Panel is a glaring error and 
calls in and of itself for reversal and remand. In a case such as 
this, with the submission of incomplete medical records to Social 
Security and the concrete confirmation of medical causation by Dr. 
Albrand, the referral to a Medical Panel was not only appropriate 
but required under the Industrial Commission's own Rules and Regulations. 
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Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court 
reverse the final agency action, and remand with instructions to 
either award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and 
medical evidence presented which establish his permanent, total 
disability claim, or in the alternative, to convene a Medical Panel 
to facilitate the Administrative Law Judge in determining whether 
the medical attention resulting from his industrial accident is 
causing his current permanent, total disability. 
DATED this (l th day of November, 1993. 
Brian D. Kelm, ESQ. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this th day 
of November, 1993 to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq. 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 South 300 East 
Post Office Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Anne Swensen, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841415-5000 
Danny Kleinsmith 
2 72 West 3 00 South 
Wellsville, Utah 84339 
File 
(1 original & 7 copies) 
(2 copies per her 
stipulation) 
(1 copy per his 
stipulation) 
(2 copies per her 
stipulation) 
(1 copy) 
(1 copy) 
BRIAN D. KELM, ESQ. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1988). 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988). 
Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9. 
EXHIBIT B: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
(November 25, 1992). 
EXHIBIT C: ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW (February 24, 1993) . 
EXHIBIT D: Social Security Administration letter from Nancy J. 
Hughes (May 26, 1992). 
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35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments 
Rehabilitation. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial 
accident, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a 
finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of 
the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission 
shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. 
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 
312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age 
of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not 
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate 
under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, 
rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 
weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in 
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the 
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent 
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of 
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier 
by the Employers* Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers1 
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable 
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permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its 
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 
35-1-69, Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the 
compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to 
the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social 
Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in 
all cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings 
have occurred: 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and 
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, refer the employee to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under 
the State Board for Vocational Education for rehabilitation training. The 
commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $3,000 
for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee. 
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for 
Vocational Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee 
has fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the 
employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be 
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a 
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding 
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a 
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits 
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as 
determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with 
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to 
regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or 
the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully 
cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, 
both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such 
body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated 
according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability 
is required in any such instance, (as last amended by Chapter 12, Laws of Utah 
1988 Second Special Session) 
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35-1-77. Medical panel -- Medical director or medical consultants — 
Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — 
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing, of a claim for compensation for injury by 
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and if 
the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to 
the medical panel under Section 35-2-56. 
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R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a 
case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 
days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting 
to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be 
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report. 
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical 
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a 
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for 
consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured 
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of 
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation 
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a 
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to 
give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be 
non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical 
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the 
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical 
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative 
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers7 Reinsurance 
Fund. 
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 91001112 
DANNY KLEINSMITH, 
Applicant, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
vs. * 
* 
ALLIED VAN LINES, GULF * 
INSURANCE and/or EMPLOYERS * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on April 
9, 1992, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. Said hearing 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative 
Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Brian 
Kelm, Attorney at Law. 
i 
The defendants, Allied Van Lines, Gulf Insurance, 
were represented by Anne Swenson, Attorney at Law. 
The defendant, Employers Reinsurance Fund, was 
represented by Erie Boorman, Administrator and 
Attorney at Law. 
This is a claim for permanent and total disability in 
connection with an alleged industrial accident of 10/31/90. 
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written 
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary 
hearing, additional time was given for the submission of documents. 
Following that time, the matter was taken under advisement by the 
Administrative Law Judge. Having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
This is a claim for permanent and total disability 
connection with an industrial accident allegedly occurring on 
in 
EXHIBIT B 
00102 
DANNY KLEINSMITH 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
October 31, 1990 and resulting in a neck injury. Kleinsmith was 
employed as a long-distance truck driver during his entire adult 
life, excluding his military service. Defendants deny that 
Kleinsmith is permanently and totally disabled, and add that, if he 
is, his October 31, 1990 industrial accident did not cause his 
disability. 
Defendants claim that Kleinsmith's pre-existing heart 
condition — with a history of two heart attacks — is the true 
cause of his inability to continue gainful employment. Defendants 
also claim that the applicant was an independent contractor of 
Allied Van Lines, not an employee for the purposes of workers' 
compensation coverage, and not in the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of injury. 
At the hearing, the facts of the relationship between Allied 
and the applicant were developed through the unrebutted testimony 
of Kleinsmith. Defendants presented no controverting evidence, 
other than introducing the contract document which recited that 
Kleinsmith was an independent contractor. (Contractor Service 
Operating Agreement between Circle Moving and Storage, Inc. 
(Company) and Danny D. Kleinsmith (Contractor), May 18, 1990.) 
The contract states several times that the relationship 
between the contracting parties is that of "independent 
contractor." It requires among other things that Contractor will 
paint and maintain his equipment to Company's specifications, will 
give Company exclusive use of such equipment, will obey Company 
guidelines on driver qualification and service apparel, will comply 
with Company procedures as to paperwork, will give Company written 
notice before substituting equipment, and will generally be liable 
to Company for losses incurred during shipment. Contractor is to 
pay his own vehicle operating expenses and hire his own helpers, 
and the Company may assess fines against him for Contractor's 
violation of Company's procedures. 
The applicant testified that Allied controlled every aspect of 
his work life. He owned a truck tractor, but leased the truck 
trailer from Allied. He stated that Allied required that both the 
truck and tractor be painted and decaled with "Allied" insignia. 
Kleinsmith testified that he was required to send a color picture 
to Allied each year showing the appearance of the truck and driver 
to satisfy Allied's standards. 
Allied required Kleinsmith to haul loads procured- through 
Allied's agent, Circle Moving and Storage. Kleinsmith testified 
that, although he believed the contract allowed him to haul non-
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Allied loads, he never did so, because he believed negative 
repercussions would result from Allied, He also testified that if 
he were able to take a non-Allied load, he believed Allied and 
their agent would receive percentages of his revenue from that 
load. 
The applicant testified that he called Allied dispatch at 
least once per day, and sometimes more often. They informed as to 
where to pick up loads and deliver them. They required him to wear 
an Allied-provided uniform. They paid for his physicals and drug 
tests. Kleinsmith acknowledged that he was allowed to hire his own 
helpers to assist him in loading and unloading duties, but 
testified that the helpers had to meet Allied's appearance and 
grooming standards, and wear an Allied t-shirt. He added that, 
while the contract provided that Allied did not select the routes 
driven by Kleinsmith, he believed the routes were selected by 
Allied in all practical effect because they would only pay him 
mileage for the most direct route between two points. 
Kleinsmith attended Allied Van Lines "van foreman school" to 
learn the Allied methods of furniture moving. He hauled no other 
items nor performed furniture moving for any other party but Allied 
during the period of time in question. The applicant recited that 
repairs and service on his truck were his responsibility, but at 
one point, Allied did advance engine repair costs to JQeinsmith 
which he later repaid. 
As referred to in the contract, Allied retained the right to 
make certain deductions from the monies paid to Kleinsmith for his 
services. These deductions included a premiums for Allied-required 
insurance coverage which was actually insurance "through the 
Company", Provision 16 and 17, Contract. This included 
occupational hazard insurance through NAIT. 
The applicant testified that Allied purchased all the required 
ICC and other permits needed for him to transport goods in certain 
states, and that he possessed no separate authority to do so. 
Kleinsmith7s claim for permanent and total disability alleges 
that he suffered an injury on October 31, 1990. On that date, 
Kleinsmith was driving his truck on return trip from Denver, 
Colorado, where he had unloaded a load. In Denver, he had spoke 
with Allied's dispatcher by phone and been told to make some 
repairs on his truck. Kleinsmith knew a repair shop in Logan, 
where he lived, and elected to make the repairs there. He arrived 
in Logan, Utah and stopped at a store for milk and cookies. He 
estimated the time of the stop was 7:30 p.m.. 
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The applicant further testified that as he was getting out of 
his truck at the store, he let go of the support too soon, and fell 
backwards four feet onto the pavement. He stated that he hurt his 
head, upper back and neck. He got up and continued about his 
business, completing his drive to his home. The next day he 
delivered the truck to the shop for repairs. 
The parties disputed whether or not Kleinsmith was in the 
course and scope of his employment at the time of the fall. 
Applicant contends that he was still "under dispatch" at the time 
of his stop and that he was in the process of obtaining truck 
repairs which were required by Allied. Defendants argue that he 
was not performing any duties for Allied at the time he stopped for 
milk and cookies, but was merely on a personal errand. They also 
point to the Driver Duty Logs completed by Kleinsmith which show 
him off duty as soon as he arrived in Logan, Utah at 6 p.m. 
As the applicant stayed off work the next couple of days, he 
noticed that his right hand and arm with stiff and sore. On 
November 2, 1990, he visited the Logan Regional Hospital Emergency 
Room. Their records show that he was reporting neck and shoulder 
pain (ex. D-l, p. 29). The records also include results of a CT 
scan which note degenerative changes in the spine, "long-standing 
spondylolysis with first degree spondylolisthesis" and "moderately 
advanced arthritic changes of the right shoulder," (Ex. D-l, p. 
30.) The records of Dr. Paul Barney, who treated the applicant, 
attributed his condition to the industrial injury on the 
Physicians First Report of Injury, (Ex. D-l, p. 128) and 
recommended further tests. 
The applicant had injured himself previously on July 30, 1989, 
while delivering a load for Allied in New Jersey. On that 
occasion, he fell off a six-foot ladder with an 80-lb. carton in 
his arms. The carton fell on him, he hurt his back, neck and heel 
bone, and was off work six weeks. No medical records were provided 
for treatment of this injury, although the exhibit did contain 
records of chiropractic treatment that Kleinsmith received from 
Dennis Paquin in May, 1990. 
For treatment of the October, 1990 injury, Kleinsmith was 
referred to Dr. Glen Church. The doctor saw him on 12/26/90 and 
noted "degenerative disc disease at C4-5"..."advanced osteophytic 
proliferation and some disc herniation at C4-5," and 
spondylolisthesis at L4-5. He recommended a myelogram and thought 
that surgery was likely. He did not make a specific statement as 
to medical causation. (Ex. D-l, p. 137.) 
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Dr. Church reviewed the myelogram in March, 1991 and concluded 
that the applicant had a herniated disc with osteophytic formation 
as well at C4-5 and he recommended surgery. (Ex. D-l, p. 138.) 
That surgery was performed on April 21, 1992, by Dr. Church at 
McKay Dee Hospital. The operative report states, ". . . The 
patient had degenerative disc disease plus disc herniation." (ex. 
D-l, p. 53.) 
The applicant testified that he was anxious after the neck 
surgery because he did not understand whether or not he had 
insurance coverage. At that point, he had been off work several 
months and was submitting claims for benefits to NAIT, his 
insurance carrier. On May 11, 1991, Kleinsmith had a second heart 
attack. He was hospitalized at Logan Regional Hospital and then 
transferred to the Veterans Administration Medical Center on May 
13, 1991. (ex. D-l, p. 82, et sea.) 
The medical opinion of Dr. Glen Church stated that the 
applicant's coronary artery disease was unrelated to his work or 
other injuries (July 8, 1991, Ex. D-l, p. 139.) The medical 
records of Dr. Edward Redd state that Kleinsmith had pre-existing 
coronary artery disease and that he ". . .probably had gradual 
progression of his coronary artery disease and likely had some 
recurrent stenosis and occlusions of the bypass grafts placed 6 
years ago. This is combination with moderately elevated blood 
pressure likely resulted in his heart attack." (Ex. D-l, p. 151.) 
Dr. Redd noted that Kleinsmith's blood pressure was not markedly 
elevated at the hospital enough to produce a myocardial infarction 
on its own. In a later opinion, he clarified that the stress could 
have contributed ,,5%" to the heart attack, and that Kleinsmith's 
overall impairment was 65% of the whole person (Ex. D-l, p. 
155.) 
Following the applicant's recovery from his second heart 
attack, he received follow-up care for his neck surgery from Dr. 
Church. Dr. Church gave him a 20% permanent partial disability 
rating without explanation as to the basis for this finding, and 
observed that he had performed the surgery ". . . for severe 
degenerative arthritis." (July 8, 1991, Ex. D-l, p. 139.) In a 
subsequent visit, Dr. Church opined that the applicant was unable 
to work due to his age and myocardial infarction. (Ex. D-l, p. 
141, see also note of February 27, 1992.) 
Dr. Church passed away in 1992, and the applicant continued 
his care with Dr. Omar Albrand, whom he saw in May, 1992. Dr. 
Albrand re-ordered diagnostic tests and found evidence of 
degenerative conditions and herniation. He opined that Kleinsmith 
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was disabled from heavy labor work, but gave no statement as to 
medical cause. (August 25, 1992 opinion.) 
On May 18, 1992, Dr. Boyd Holbrook performed an Independent 
Medical Evaluation. He concluded that the majority of Kleinsmith's 
orthopedic problems were pre-existing and degenerative, and he 
declined to ascribe any permanent partial impairment to the 
10/31/90 industrial accident. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Independent Contractor/Employee 
The applicant, Danny Kleinsmith, has proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he was an employee, not an independent 
contractor, of the defendant, Allied. Van Lines and their agent, 
Circle Moving and Storage, Inc. 
Further, Kleinsmith's position as an employee is supported by 
the tests found in relevant case law on independent contractor 
status under workers' compensation law. The distinction between 
independent contractor and employee for purposes of workers' 
compensation coverage turns on several factors, including the 
hiring party's right to control the individual, the method of 
payment, furnishing of equipment, and right to fire. 
The seminal case in Utah on this subject also dealt with a 
truck driver - Harry L. Young and Sons. Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 
316 (Utah 1975.) In Young, the applicant, Ashton, was a truck 
driver who leased H.L. Young's truck. Ashton had to clear loads 
with Young's supervisor, check with Young's dispatcher regularly, 
and was advised by Young as to mileage and speed limits. Young had 
the right to penalize Ashton for violating company policies. The 
court found that Ashton was an employee for workers' compensation 
purposes. 
In Young, the Court noted, "The determination of the status of 
an employee is based on various factors and of primary concern is 
the control, direction, supervision or the right to control, direct 
or supervise on behalf of the employer." The Court also stated 
that none of the factors in a "right to control" test is separately 
dispositive, but "[I]t is from consideration of all of them 
together that the determination is to be made..." Id. 
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In the case of Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 
P.2d 427 (Utah 1986), to which the parties cite, the Utah Supreme 
Court emphasized that ". . . it will almost always follow that if 
the evidence shows that an 'employer7 retains the right to control 
the work of the claimant, the claimant is the employer's employee 
for workmen's compensation purposes [citations omitted]. 
Certainly, the concept of right to control is not to be rigidly and 
narrowly defined. Rather, it should be defined to give full effect 
to the remedial proposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
[citations omitted.]11 The Court added that it was proper to 
resolve doubt as to whether the worker was an employee in favor of 
the employee. 
Thus, the language of a contract is merely one factor to be 
considered in determining a true independent contractor status. 
The actual practice and intent of the parties may be more 
instructive to the fact-finder than the bare contractual language 
itself. In the present case, both the contract and the parties' 
practice indicate a high level of control was exerted over 
Kleinsmith by Allied. 
The Administrative Law Judge specifically finds that the 
applicant's day-to-day work was controlled by Allied, because they 
controlled his constant contact with their dispatch, his appearance 
and the appearance and condition of his equipment and helpers, his 
conduct, his completion of their paperwork, his compliance with 
their policies, his submission to their deductions for insurance 
and fines, and his ability to procure non-Allied loads. Despite 
the illusion of freedom that his contract recited, Kleinsmith was 
very much bound to Allied's control of his workday. 
Course and Scope of Employment 
The next issue to address is the question of whether 
Kleinsmith was in the course and scope of his employment with 
Allied when he stopped to get milk and cookies when he arrived in 
Logan on October 31, 1990. Although the driver's log states that 
he went off duty at 6 p.m., Kleinsmith testified that he actually 
arrived in Logan at 7:30 p.m. and stopped for milk and cookies as 
soon as he arrived in town. The Administrative Law Judge adopts 
the applicant's testimony as more accurate, having had the 
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness firsthand. 
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The Administrative Law Judge further finds the applicant to be 
in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the stop, 
A break for food is commonly recognized as a personal comfort 
errand which does not constitute a substantial deviation from the 
work duties. Kleinsmith was on his way to obtain truck repairs. 
A stop for food is an incidental and reasonably necessary activity 
for a long-distance truck driver, and it was conducted in a 
reasonable method with no intent to abandon his job-oriented 
purpose. In fact, Kleinsmith went on to deliver the truck for 
repairs as ordered. 
Medical Causation 
Having found that the applicant was an employee of the 
defendants for workers' compensation purposes, we turn to the 
question of his entitlement to permanent and total disability 
benefits. Unfortunately, the Administrative Law Judge concludes 
that the applicant has failed to prove medical causation. 
First, it is clear that Kleinsmith's heart attack was a non-
industrial condition. The medical records of Dr. Glen Church 
diagnosed Kleinsmith with coronary artery disease unrelated to his 
work or other injuries as of July 8, 1991 (Ex. D-l, p. 139). The 
medical records of Dr. Edward Redd clearly state that Kleinsmith 
had pre-existing coronary artery disease and that he ". . .probably 
had gradual progression of his coronary artery disease and likely 
had some recurrent stenosis and occlusions of the bypass grafts 
placed 6 years ago. This is combination with moderately elevated 
blood pressure likely resulted in his heart attack." (Ex. D-l, p. 
151) Dr. Redd noted that Kleinsmith's blood pressure was not 
markedly elevated at the hospital enough to produce a myocardial 
infarction on its own. In a later opinion, he clarified that the 
stress could have contributed "5%" to the heart attack, and that 
Kleinsmith/s overall impairment was 65% whole person (Ex. D-l, p. 
155.) 
Second, the records show that the applicant was awarded Social 
Security Disability solely on the basis of his [non-industrial] 
heart condition. (Letter from Nancy J. Hughes, May 26, 1992.) Dr. 
Church found him unable to work due to his age and his myocardial 
infarction, (Ex. D-l, p. 141.) No doctor has attributed his heart 
condition to an industrial cause. In fact, the applicant's doctors 
specifically refuse to attribute causation of his heart attack to 
his October 31, 1990, neck injury. 
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Third, Kleinsmith's cervical problems were, at best, due to a 
combination of industrial as well as pre-existing causes. The 
medical record contain extensive references to the pre-existing 
degenerative cervical conditions by every physician who examined 
Kleinsmith. 
The question before the Commission is whether or not the 
industrial injury occurring on October 31, 1991, was a significant 
cause of Applicant's permanent and total disability status. The 
inquiry into causation of Applicant's disability is governed by 
case law set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986) and its progeny. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the 
industrial accident need not be the "proximate cause" of the 
disability, but it must be a "dominant" or "significant" cause. 
Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the case herein, there are medical records of 
incapacitating heart problems which are unrelated to Kleinsmith's 
industrial accident. His cervical problems were only temporarily 
incapacitating following surgery, and even then, they were not 
wholly the result of the industrial incident. 
The record contains no clear physician's opinion which states 
that Kleinsmith is permanently and totally disabled due to his 
cervical problems, nor even that his cervical problems were solely 
caused by his industrial accident. Dr. Albrand's opinion assists 
the Applicant somewhat with the first part of the equation, but 
fails to establish the industrial causation aspect. And, with the 
record in that posture, the Applicant has failed to prove medical 
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. 
After reviewing the above findings of fact, the Administrative 
Law Judge finds insufficient evidence of both legal and medical 
causation to rule that the October 31, 1990, industrial accident 
was a significant cause of Applicant's permanent and total 
disability. 
The present case is similar to Hodges v. Western Piling and 
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986), wherein an applicant was 
denied permanent and total disability benefits on the grounds of 
medical causation. In that case, medical evidence established that 
the applicant would be "one hundred percent impaired as a result of 
arthritis alone. . ." Id. at 721. The record in this case 
indicates that Kleinsmith may have been disabled due to his pre-
existing coronary artery disease, and that condition had the most 
practical and measurable impact on his ability to perform the 
strenuous work of a long-distance truck driver. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the permanent and total 
disability claim of the applicant, Danny Kleinsmith, should be and 
the same is hereby denied for lack of medical causation, and is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Lisa-Michele Church 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified this,^^day of ~ > 7 ^ A , J , 199^. 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case Number 91001112 
Danny Kleinsmith, * 
Applicant, * 
* 
vs. * 
Allied Van Lines,Gulf Insurance * 
Company and/or the Employers7 * 
Reinsurance Fund, * 
* 
Respondents. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of the applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
Danny Kleinsmith ("applicant") timely filed a motion for 
review of the administrative law judge's ("ALJ") order denying his 
claim for permanent total disability benefits. The ALJ denied the 
claim because the applicant failed to show, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that his industrial accident of October 31, 1990 was 
the medical cause of his permanent and total disability. The 
applicant asserts that the ALJ failed to liberally construe the 
workers compensation act in favor of the applicant and erred in 
concluding that the applicant was not permanently and totally 
disabled as a result of his industrial accident of October 31, 
1990. 
1. DID THE ALJ FAIL TO LIBERALLY CONSTRUE THE 
UTAH WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT? 
The applicant quotes language from Chandler v. Industrial 
Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919) , this case discussed the proper 
construction and application of the Utah workers compensation act. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Chandler, noted that the statute was to 
be "liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice" and "that in view of the purposes 
of such acts, in case there i^ any doubt respecting the right to 
compensation, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the 
employee or his dependents as the case may be." Id. at 1021-1022. 
The applicant claims that the ALJ erred in her failure to 
construe the workers compensation act liberally in favor of 
awarding benefits to the applicant. He asserts that a long history 
of Utah workers compensation case law supports his view that any 
doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the 
claimant. The respondent notes that the Utah courts have required 
liberal construction of the workers compensation statute and 
resolution of doubts in favor of the applicant in situations where 
the evidence on both sides is equally probative. However, there is 
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no requirement that an applicant be awarded benefits when he has 
failed to present evidence to show the requisite causal connection 
between his disabling condition and his industrial accident. 
The cases cited by the applicant in support of his motion for 
review relate to the general principles behind the proper 
construction of the workers compensation statute. The Utah Supreme 
Court has noted that "the right to compensation arises out of the 
relation existing between employer and employee, and that the 
injury arises out of and in the course of employment." Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020, 1021 (Utah 1919). Nothing in 
the analysis of the purposes of the workers compensation act 
presented in Chandler supports the notion that an employee who 
cannot establish a causal connection between his disability and his 
employment is entitled to benefits. 
In the present case, the applicant failed to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his industrial accident and 
injury caused his subsequent disability. The analysis of medical 
causation will be set out infra. 
2. DID THE ALJ ERR IN FINDING THAT THE APPLICANT 
WAS NOT TOTALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED AS A RESULT 
OF THE ACCIDENT OF OCTOBER 31, 1990? 
The applicant asserts that the medical and testimonial 
evidence in the record supports his contention that the industrial 
accident of October 31, 1990, rendered him permanently and totally 
disabled due to his back condition. The applicant asserts that his 
social security disability benefits were awarded solely on the 
basis of his coronary condition because the Social Security 
Administration ("SSA") did not consider his back condition when 
they made the award. The applicant asserts that the ALJ simply 
adopted the SSA's findings which did not include any findings 
related to his back condition, and then relied upon them to deny 
his claim. 
Review of the ALJ,s decision and the record show that this is 
simply not the case. The ALJ noted that the applicant's heart 
condition was not industrially related and that he was awarded 
social security disability solely on the basis of his non-
industrial heart condition. Order, p. 8. Review of the medical 
records shows that the applicant's treating physician, Dr. Church1 
did not solely attribute the applicant's back and neck problems to 
his industrial injury of October 31, 1990. Exhibit D-l p.135-141. 
Dr. Church noted that the applicant suffered an industrial 
1
 Who, unfortunately, is now deceased. 
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accident in August 1989 when he fell backwards from a ladder while 
carrying a 70 pound box. Dr. Church noted that the applicant fell 
from his truck in October 1990 and began to have headaches. The 
applicant has experienced pain and weakness in his right arm, 
however, since the August 1989 accident. Id. at 135. X-rays 
reviewed by Dr. Church in January 1991, showed degenerative disc 
disease at C4-5. A CT scan showed "advanced osteophytic 
proliferation and some disc herniation at C4-5." Id. at 137. In 
his letter of July 8, 1991, Dr. Church stated that the applicant 
"underwent anterior cervical discectomy and fusion for severe 
degenerative arthritis." Id. at 139 (emphasis added). Dr. Church 
went on to opine that he did "not think the injuries caused his 
heart attack." Id. 
Dr. Church further opined that the applicant had a permanent 
partial disability rating of 20 percent although it is unclear what 
the rating is attributed to. The doctor felt that the applicant 
should have a permanent disability rating based on his coronary 
artery disease and his neck. Id. The doctor did not apportion the 
disability between pre-existing, non-industrial and industrial 
causes, but noted that he would consider the applicant to be 
permanently disabled from his neck alone for six weeks from the 
date of the July 6, 1991 letter. Id. at 140. In the last record 
entered by Dr. Church, he stated that the applicant was totally 
disabled from work as a furniture mover, but again, did not attempt 
at that time, to apportion his disability among the several 
possible causes. Id. at 141. 
X-rays interpreted by Dr. Dennis Paquin, D.C. on or about 
November 20, 1990 were noted to show "Degenerative joint disease C4 
and C5; Osteophytic lesions anterior motor unit C7; Disc 
deterioration C4 and C5; Mild degenerative joint changes of C6 and 
C7." Exhibit D-l, p.150. An X-ray series conducted on November 2, 
1990 was interpreted as follows: "1. Cervical spine showing disc 
disease with some foraminal encroachment of the C4-5 level. Milder 
degenerative changes at C6-7 are also noted without definite 
fractures.... 3. Moderately advanced arthritic changes of the right 
shoulder." Exhibit D-l at 30. * A CT scan interpreted by Dr. Child 
on November 13, 1990 showed "Advanced disc degenerative change is 
present resulting in moderate posterior bony osteophyte 
formation..., ventral encroachment upon the spinal canal by the 
osteophyte, this does not appear to encroach significantly upon the 
spinal cord..." and "associated proliferative degenerative 
changes of the uncovertebral joints and these result in moderate 
narrowing of both nerve root canals." Dr. Child also noted 
degenerative changes at C5-6 with "moderate encroachment on the 
left C5-C6 nerve root canal, "moderate disc degenerative change ... 
without significant posterior osteophyte formation and without 
significant narrowing of the nerve root canals" at C6-C7 and 
"modest degenerative changes at C7-T1 with no evidence for 
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encroachment upon neural structures." Id. at 32. 
A cervical myelogram performed at McKay-Dee Medical Center on 
February 21, 1991, showed amputation of the nerve root sleeves at 
C4-C5 bilaterally and at C7-T1 on the right side. The myelogram 
also showed a ventral osteophytic formation at C4-C5 related to 
degenerative disease. Jd. at 50. A CT scan on the same date 
showed a bulging or herniated disc. Id. The applicant had an 
anterior cervical diskectomy and fusion of C4-5 and C6-7 in April 
1991. An X-ray on April 3, 1990 showed that the applicant had 
"mild osteoarthritis of the right shoulder" as well as 
"degenerative disc disease, degenerative facet disease and neural 
foraminal narrowing of the cervical spine." Id. at 75-77. 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook reviewed the applicant's medical records 
upon the request of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. Dr. Holbrook 
observed that "the pathology in the cervical spine was pre-
existing. The first accident in July or August 1989 precipitated 
it to a symptomatic standpoint from which it never recovered." 
Holbrook letter, May 18, 1992, p. 5. 
The ... accident of 10-30-90 called attention to the neck 
problem and radiculopathy. The only possible contributing 
effect or possible aggravation by the fall that can be 
identified is the statement of Dr. Barney when he first 
saw him 11-20-90 is 'feels that he has lost strength 
right arm.' It is not clear that this means that he lost 
strength since this accident and Dr. Church noted that it 
was there before.... 
Further degenerative changes that occur will not be the 
result of this industrial accident but will be the result 
of the nature of the progressive degenerative arthritis 
that he has in his cervical spine. It is not reasonable 
to assert a relationship of the industrial accident to 
further progressive changes as these are inevitable 
regardless of the industrial accident. We do know that 
there appears to be an ^ acceleration of degenerative 
changes adjacent to fused levels. At the greatest risk 
is the unfused disc at C-5-6 as it is a mobile space 
between two fixed fused segments. 
Id, 
Under the heading "conclusions," Dr. Holbrook noted that: 
The industrial accident did not specifically cause any 
identifiable pathological process and thus it does not 
appear that any of the permanent impairment should be 
ascribed to the fall of 10-31-91 [sic] as the ultimate 
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surgery was inevitable... If an ulnar neuropathy is 
identified as suggested by Dr. Church 2-27-92 there is no 
current information that would relate it to the accident 
of 10-31-91 [sic] at this time. The history and physical 
findings indicate that this patient was a candidate for 
surgery at the time that this accident occurred and had 
he sought consultation at that time surgery would have 
been recommended... Further degenerative changes of the 
cervical spine are inevitable and would have been 
progressive in nature absent this industrial accident and 
thus those further changes when they occur are not a 
result of this industrial accident... Dr. Church reports 
no neck pain or radicular pain and no muscle wasting or 
any weakness that he can determine thus the portion of 
his disability related to the cervical spine would be 
only that contributed by limitation of motion. There 
would be a significant calculated permanent impairment of 
the cervical spine. 
Id. at p. 6, (emphasis in original). 
Dr. Otmar W. Albrand examined the applicant in May 1992. 
Following his first examination of the applicant, the doctor 
recommended a new cervical and lumbar myelogram. Letter, July 9, 
1992. The reports showed that the applicant has: 
degenerative disc disease and spondylosis at C3-C4 and 
C5-C6, minimal evidence of diffuse bulge of minimal 
subligamenous disc herniation. At C6-C7 there is 
evidence of posterior hypertropic vertebral body bone 
spur, the old bone graft pressing on the anterior portion 
of the spinal cord.... I feel the patient is disabled 
with the problem in his neck and also in his low back . .. 
All the findings on the myelogram CT are consistent with 
a painful condition not suitable for heavy labor type 
work. 
Letter, August 25, 1992. 
In response to a letter from the applicant's attorney, Dr. 
Albrand wrote: 
He still has complaints referable to his neck and low 
back with limitation of motion as the main physical and 
objective findings with muscle spasm in the neck and low 
back. I might say that his complaints referable to his 
neck and low back contribute to his disability at 
present. It seems to me on reading his history that the 
patient was out of the work force because of neck problem 
[sic] and while recovering from the surgery had a 
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myocardial infarction and required coronary bypass 
surgery. 
Letter, September 10, 1992. 
Dr. Albrand subsequently stated that "[i]t is also my opinion 
that Mr. Kleinsmith is suffering from injuries sustained 10-31-91 
[sic] in an industrial accident and due to those injuries he's 
unable to return to substantial work or gainful employment." 
Letter, December 10, 1992. The applicant has also submitted a 
letter from his cardiologist, Dr. Redd in which the doctor stated: 
As I understand the facts, Mr. Kleinsmith had a neck and 
shoulder injury on the job resulting in apparently 
permanent disability of that extremity. This is based on 
the patients [sic] report of a conversation with Dr. 
Glenn Church who has expired.... It must be stated in no 
uncertain terms, however, that the patients [sic] 
original disability was the result of an injury he 
sustained while working. 
Letter, April 28, 1992. 
A determination of permanent total disability is a question of 
fact. Kerans v. Industrial Commission, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1985). 
We will not disturb an ALJ,s findings of fact when there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support those findings. We 
believe that there is substantial evidence in the record to support 
the ALJ's determination that the applicant is not permanently and 
totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident on October 
31, 1990. 
The Industrial Accident Division's rules on permanent total 
disability require that the ALJ determine "if a significant cause 
of the disability is the claimant's industrial accident or some 
other unrelated cause or causes." U.A.C. R568-1-17(C) (1992); See 
Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Ct.App. 1988) . After 
reviewing the entire record, *we believe that the applicant has 
failed to show a causal connection between his industrial accident 
of 10-31-90 and his disability. It is clear from the record that 
the applicant suffered from arthritic and degenerative conditions 
in his cervical spine prior to the accident of October 31, 1990. 
Dr. Albrand asserted that there is a causal connection between the 
October 1990 accident and the applicant's disability, but failed to 
discuss the extent of that disability in relation to the 
applicant's pre-existing conditions. All of the doctors who 
examined the applicant discussed his disability from his neck and 
coronary conditions, but none of them attempted to relate the 
various disabilities to a specific industrial or non-industrial 
cause. 
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We cannot award the applicant permanent total disability 
benefits in the absence of competent medical evidence which shows 
that the applicant's industrial accident was a "significant" cause 
of his disability. We therefore affirm the ALJ's findings and 
order. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law 
judge dated November 25, 1992 is hereby affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the 
Utah Court of Appeals within 3 0 days from the date of this order, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, 
and 63-46b-16, and Couriers v. Dep/t. of Employment Security et 
al. , Case No. 920621-CA (Utah App. Dec. 4, 1992). The requesting 
party shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing 
for appeals purposes. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairma: 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
Certified t h i s ^ y ^ d a y o f ^ / y ^ w 
ATTEST: "JT 
Patricia O. Asnby 
Commission Secretary 
1993. 
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Mr. Kleinsmith received his SSI award based upon the medical records 
in his file which were those of Dr. Redd. The records of Dr. Church, 
the doctor for his neck/back/upper extremities were not considered so 
it may well be that he would have qualified for SSI based upon those 
problems as well. If there are any questions, please feel free to 
contact our office. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
u p e r v i s o r 
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